Water governance decentralization and the setting-up of catchment management agencies in South Africa : when a social transformation agenda competes with a managerial one by Bourblanc, Magalie
 © Bourblanc, 2011, Safewater-Arise project Page 1 
 
Safewater-Arise Module 1: Final Report on the “Collective action and local water 
management” research project (How social, organizational and institutional features of 




 “Water Governance Decentralization and the setting-up of Catchment 
Management Agencies in South Africa: 
When a social transformation agenda competes with a managerial one” 
 
Dr Magalie Bourblanc 
May 2011 
Contents 
Executive summary: ................................................................................................................................ 2 
Research object: ...................................................................................................................................... 3 
Research Question: ................................................................................................................................. 3 
Hypotheses: ............................................................................................................................................. 3 
Initial Methodological framework : ......................................................................................................... 4 
Revised Methodological framework : ..................................................................................................... 5 
Factors facilitating CMAs ‘ establishment process: Hypotheses confirmed and hypotheses disqualified
 ................................................................................................................................................................. 7 
Factors facilitating CMAs ‘continued post-establishment process ....................................................... 13 
Challenges facing the CMAs’ functioning .............................................................................................. 17 
Conclusion and Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 30 
List of Abbreviations .............................................................................................................................. 34 
List of interviews ................................................................................................................................... 35 
Maps of Catchment Management Areas .............................................................................................. 43 
 © Bourblanc, 2011, Safewater-Arise project Page 2 
 
References ............................................................................................................................................. 47 
 
Executive summary:  
 
This research project initially aimed at analyzing the establishment process of catchment 
management agencies (CMAs) across South Africa through a comparative methodological 
framework. However the “institutional realignment” process initiated in 2007 at the national level 
unilaterally suspended CMAs’ establishment progress and substantially impacted the empirical work 
that had to be conducted. Therefore the research expanded to include more cases to study and re-
focused at the same time on the post-establishment process and current functioning of two already 
gazetted CMAs: Inkomati and BreedeOverBerg. The research emphasized the instrumental role of 
irrigation boards and of organized commercial farming interests in the setting-up of CMAs. As regard 
the functioning of already existing CMAs, the research further concludes on one major challenge for 
the future of CMAs, i.e. the existence of two competing paradigms within the organization, a 
managerial one and a social transformation one. Hence, if economic and financial sustainability are a 
pre-requisite of CMAs’ existence, this managerial imperative should not be raised as its core goal. 
Indeed, CMAs cannot be taken as mere “companies”. Their governing board in particular is a political 
arena in the most generic sense of the word: not a world of politics (or of political factions) but a 
polity which arbitrates among different –sometimes conflicting- uses, and whose mandate is  to 
ensure a socially equitable share of water resources in order to redress past inequalities in water 
allocation. This crucial objective has to be reflected in the governing board’s composition and in the 
division of tasks between the governing board and the CMA’s staff.  
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Research object:  
 
The study explores the decentralization of water resources management to the river basin 
level in South Africa, analyzing more precisely the creation of parastatal organizations called 
CMAs at the river basin level. When compared to the Dutch water boards, which are very 
much similar to the CMAs, it is worth noticing that South Africa has demonstrated a more 
top-down process -from the national to the local level- in the creation of new institutions for 
water management, i.e. WUA and CMAs (Raven 2004) (p.4), which may prove challenging in 
the attempt to launch a decentralized organization that relies on grass-root involvement of 
water stakeholders into the process. This top-down approach is not a new trend however 
when we realize that the first irrigation boards in the country (in Western Cape) had been 
themselves forced into being by the rulings of Water Courts set in order to settle dispute 
between irrigating farmers (interview 34). Indeed, there is a long tradition in South Africa of 
governmental involvement in the setting–up of IBs. Governmental authorities strongly 
encouraged their creation already back in the late 19th century because it saved these 
authorities from getting involved in every dispute.  
However with only two CMAs already existing out of the 19 that were initially planned in the 
National Water Act (NWA, 1998), it is obvious that this top-down institutionalization process 
has proven nowadays to be more problematic. Thus the research project aims at 
determining the reasons that explain the difficulties encountered in the implementation 
process of the NWA and especially the delay in establishing decentralized water 
management organizations, i.e. Catchment Management Agencies in South Africa.   
Research Question:  
 
What are the conditions/factors that favor or on the contrary hamper the successful 
establishment of CMAs? 
Hypotheses:  
 
1. The development and coverage of irrigation boards (IBs) within a basin is a critical 
factor which determines to a large extent the commercial farmers’ mobilization 
capacity, and hence the support of a very crucial stakeholder in the process. Our 
hypothesis is that the most IBs in a basin, the most chance for a CMA to get support 
from grass-root level in its establishment process and its latter functioning. 
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2. More broadly, the assumption that organized interests in general have a tendency of 
influencing positively the pace of the CMA establishment process and its subsequent 
operations led us to consider that the more “big players” in a river basin the more 
chance to get a CMA up and running at the earliest time. We define “big players” in 
terms of strong organizational capacity. Indeed, considering the complexity of this 
institutional process, it was expected that areas and sectors just coming out of under-
development in South Africa would have major difficulty coping with the institutional 
and organizational maturity that requires the launching of a CMA establishment 
process. Also let us specify that although organizational capacity is very often 
associated with big economic interests, it cannot be reduced to it. The GDP for 
instance does not provide a trustworthy indicator in that respect. We identified the 
commercial forestry, the mining sector, agri-business, the tourism interests (game 
farming and conservancy interests), Eskom, water service providers, municipalities 
considered as cities, South African Local Government Association (SALGA), and 
international partners belonging to international treaty obligation in terms of 
transboundary water management as potential “big players”.  
 
3. An instrumental role of DWA regional office as a coordinator of grass-root efforts to 
come together and build a CMA. 
 
Initial Methodological framework : 
 
This research project applies qualitative research methods. It relies on inductive methods, 
based on field work (Beaud and Weber 1998), case study analysis (Yin 2003) and semi-
conductive interviews (Blanchet and Gotman 2005). More specifically, we opted for the 
application of a qualitative comparative method (Przeworski 1987; Ragin 1996; Hassenteufel 
2000). 
Indeed, due to various constraints (financial, time, ongoing CMAs establishment progress 
etc), a small-N case study comparison has been retained. The idea was to compare a 
successful case of CMA establishment with a less successful case. For the latter, case studies 
that typically represent good candidates would be officially established CMAs (gazetted 
CMAs) that in practice are not yet functioning. Conversely, as for the former case, the 
Inkomati CMA was an obvious case study since it has been the first CMA ever established in 
RSA and so far, the unique CMA having received part of the competences’ delegation that 
CMAs are supposed to get from the DWA. In an initial phase of the research project, Tugela 
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CMA appeared to be an interesting case to be compared with Inkomati. Since the research 
could only be developed based on a very small-N case study (no more than two in-depth 
case studies), the idea was to try to come as close as possible to the strategy of comparing 
cases which would offer the most similarities for a starting point (similar inputs) together 
with the most diverging results (different outputs). Tugela and Inkomati were the two cases 
appearing the most suitable for applying this comparative ideal-typical method.  
Surely, these two river basins display substantive differences but some of these differences 
were interesting characteristics as far as our first set of hypotheses was concerned. Indeed, 
comparing Tugela and Inkomati river basins helped contrasting our first hypothesis about 
the number of former irrigation boards. We assume that a dense network of former 
irrigation boards was a favoring factor for a quick establishment of CMA. Indeed, following 
that hypothesis, the more developed a water body is (the most hydraulic infrastructures 
along the water course it gets), the more chance for a CMA to get established in a rather 
advanced stage. With numerous small and short surface water courses, Tugela does not 
show very “developed rivers” – i.e. rivers with high technical infrastructures along the water 
courses-, and therefore it has far less IBs if any (interviews 13, 15, 20). In comparison, 
Inkomati Rivers were quite developed even though not the most developed ones across 
South Africa, and therefore it counts a lot of IBs whose role has historically been to manage 
among themselves the water that these big infrastructures were storing.  
In addition, a second hypothesis could be tested. It has to do with the level of experience the 
regional office of the DWA in charge of preparing the CMA establishment has. In that 
respect, it seems that even though in both cases, the regional offices were officially a new 
creation of the Post-Apartheid regime (together with the creation of new provinces that did 
not always correspond to the former regional borders in the Apartheid Era), in Inkomati 
however the DWA staff seems to have benefited more experience as former DWA members 
than in the case of Tugela (KwazuluNatal province) which was granted less staff already 
familiar with DWA culture and know-how (interview 5).   
 
Revised Methodological framework : 
 
After the above described methodology was developed, a field work session in Tugela WMA 
in August 2010 revealed that it would be difficult to conduct such investigations in the region 
since the whole establishment process had come to a halt mostly for reasons exterior to 
Tugela institutional and organizational setting. Indeed, Tugela along with the other already 
gazetted CMAs had been stopped by the Institutional Realignment Process started at the 
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DWA national level in 20071. This political initiative made impossible the previously 
conceived comparison since the DWA regional office itself had lost track of water users and 
other water indirect actors that were supposed to be interviewed.  
Only Inkomati and BreedeOverBerg CMAs establishment process and functioning could still 
be observed since they were the only two decentralized water management institutions 
whose progress had not been blocked by the DWA head office. Therefore it was decided to 
make the comparison framework evolve accordingly and a field work session in Western 
Cape was planned in November 2010. Although this new comparative strategy offered less 
contrasting potential than the one between Inkomati and Tugela, it was expected that it 
would still be possible to draw interesting lessons out of it. The research question had 
nonetheless to be adapted. We would no longer investigate the establishment process only. 
Or rather we would from now on expand the meaning of this establishment process which, 
in our understanding, consists of two equally important moments: the pre-establishment 
phase leading to a CMA being officially gazetted and a post-establishment phase consisting 
of the time-laps between an officially existing CMA and a CMA actually performing its 
delegated functions. Thus, the study would to a large extent try to understand the 
functioning of the CMAs as well.   
 
In addition, we took the decision to open up the number of case studies. If it was no longer 
possible to test our hypotheses on a very rigorous basis, then one of the options was to 
multiply the observations based perhaps on less interviews and more superficial analysis, 
but on a greater number of cases from which we could derive some commonalities. In that 
respect, a good opportunity was offered by the designation of five priority WMAs in the 
National Water Resource Strategy drafted in September 2004. Indeed, according to this 
document, « five catchment management areas have been identified where the 
establishment of catchment management agencies is urgent. These are the Inkomati, 
Olifants, Breede, Crocodile West and Marico, Mvoti to Mzimkulu.” 
This was representing a good opportunity for our comparative work because we could 
expect to have something to observe in these areas. In particular, we could infer from the 
priority status granted to these WMAs that they would receive enough incentives and that 
initiatives would be taken specifically in these areas, out of which we would be able to study 
potential challenges met along the way. The National Water Resources Strategy confirms 
that in 2003-2004, Tugela and Inkomati (along with 6 other CMAs: Usutu; Mvoti; Crocodile 
                                                          
1
 The institutional realignment process was a national initiative led by the Ministry of Finance. Facing the 
mushrooming of institutions having to report to the Minister of Water Affairs, the idea was to engage in a 
reflection over a possible reduction of their number. See next section for a more detailed presentation of the 
rationale behind the initiative. 
 © Bourblanc, 2011, Safewater-Arise project Page 7 
 
West; Olifants; Gouritz; Breede; ) had already been set up. Moreover, in KwazuluNatal the 
DWA regional office decided to start off with the three WMAs encompassed in the limits of 
its territory (Tugela, Mvoti to Mzimkulu and Usutu to Mhlatuze), and not only with Mvoti 
(interview 17). Consequently, five field work terrains were eventually selected: in 
Mpumalanga province with the Inkomati water management area (WMA); in KwazuluNatal 
province with the Tugela WMA and Usutu to Mhlatuze WMA; in North West province with 
Crocodile West and Marico WMA and in Western Cape province with the BreedeOverBerg 
WMA. 
 The integrality of the statements that we will next expose in the following sections 
are all based on our series of about 85 interviews, on our observations during field works on 
these 5 terrains and on the confrontation between information gathered from one interview 
to the other, from one case study to the other (re-cutting the information and being able to 
interpret what has not been mentioned). We mention as much as possible from where we 
collected the information but from time to time we had to respect the will of our 
interviewees who would insist on not to be cited on particular points that they perceived as 
sensitive information. Therefore, some points are formulated in this report without direct 
reference to the interview it comes from. 
Factors facilitating CMAs ‘ establishment process: Hypotheses 
confirmed and hypotheses disqualified 
 
 Preliminary remarks: 
First of all, before turning to a presentation of the results of our field work sessions, we 
would like to mention as a foreword, some difficulties encountered in undertaking empirical 
work, which relates to the problem of a lack of institutional memory of respondents we met 
through individual interviews. The high staff turn-over in DWA administrations especially 
imposed some limits on this work, making it difficult to meet with individuals sufficiently 
“clued-up” in the subject investigated. In addition, it was also difficult to conduct field work 
in Tugela and Crocodile West and Marico (CWM) where the momentum seemed to have 
been lost since the beginning of the institutional realignment process: the contact details of 
people who used to be part of water forums2 were outdated and the memory of those who 
could be found back was difficult to recover after at least four years of institutional stand- 
still.  
                                                          
2
 Catchment Forum meetings were used in order to establish Catchment Steering committees (CSC) whose 
main composition was the major water users and interest groups in the river basin. This took place prior to the 
formal establishment of CMAs. 
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Secondly, considering the small number of cases compared, it is important to emphasize 
again that we could not really test our hypotheses, but at least the depth of our interviews 
and diversity of interviewees’ profiles (see appendix for a detailed presentation of people 
interviewed) ensured a sufficient robustness for the conclusions drawn.  
Thirdly, judging what went wrong by comparing CMAs’ establishment process between one 
another is not an easy task considering the fact that the national process of Water Sector 
Institutional Realignment put most of these initiatives on hold unilaterally, irrespective of 
the advancement progress of most of the different establishment’s initiatives. The analysis 
of this institutional realignment process is beyond the scope of this study. Indeed its 
dynamics would deserve a study on its own. For now, let us briefly mention that this process 
encompassed a reviewing of the whole water sector institutional framework, including 
“mandates, functions, governance, structure and accountability” of the “water services 
institutions that are created and governed by DWA”, and “to align these with the regulatory 
and service delivery mandate of the Minister of Water Affairs”. Since water is an exclusive 
national competence unlike agriculture for instance which is a both a provincial and a 
national prerogative3, it was believed that more strategic thinking was needed, especially 
after the recent experiences of mismanagement demonstrated by water boards and water 
service providers at the local government level. An explanation related to power issues 
cannot be excluded however: indeed the mushrooming of parastatal institutions could have 
been perceived as threatening ANC’s ability -as a centrally-organized political party- to 
control a sector and to be in a position to implement its policies. This is easy to understand 
when ones realizes that competences have not even been transferred from national to 
regional already-equipped offices of the same institution, therefore a fortiori to delegate 
functions to a new body, would create quite expectedly some resistance.     
As a consequence of the institutional realignment process, a moratorium was 
imposed on most of the gazetted CMAs, except for two of them: Inkomati and 
BreedeOverBerg. The fact that BreedeOverBerg was retained as the second gazetted CMA 
which will benefit more attention and support seems to be reflecting much more a change in 
DWA priority WMAs than the state of advancement of BreedeOverBerg CMA (BOCMA) as 
compared other areas (interview 80). Therefore, the meaning of the end result (effective 
establishment of CMA or not) should be taken with caution, and it is better in any case to 
analyze the establishment process than just the end point (interview 5). Having said that, 
since CWM WMA was at some point foreseen by the DWA as the leader in CMA’s 
                                                          
3
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108, 1996, Schedule 4 Part A 
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establishment process4, and progressing at the same pace as Inkomati, it is still very 
interesting to compare the two and inquire why CWM eventually lost pace with Inkomati.   
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that we wanted to give our interviewees the 
opportunity to communicate their opinion on what was constituting the major driver of a 
“pioneering” CMA establishment process5. However no conclusive or concordant account 
about the main ingredients of success involved in the establishment were identified. 
Nevertheless it is interesting to note that when having to select which WMA to start with, 
they personally thought that factors related to the financial and economic viability of the 
future CMA were decisive variable (interviews 74 and 17). In KZN for instance, the official in 
DWA regional office evoked the fact that the decision was taken in his province to start off 
out of the three WMA with Mvoti catchment which appeared as the strongest one:  
« you have strong urban structure, you have strong industries, strong municipalities, strong 
agriculture base, you have a system fully allocated, so you have enough users to pay and 
support the existence of CMA *…+ Those are easier to manage, coordinate them and get 
revenue from *…+ We have customers to support the existence of the CMA”.  
Considering now Crocodile West and Marico WMA, it seems that the financial viability of the 
catchment was also a decisive factor to retain this WMA as a pilot area. Indeed, the river 
basin is characterized by the strong presence of the mining industry together with also part 
of wealthy municipalities such as Johannesburg and Pretoria within the catchment 
(interview 69). 
However, these factors did not prove to be that decisive considering the fact that the CWM 
CMA is still not up and running, even though CWM could appear at some stage back in the 
early 2000s to have caught up with the advance that Inkomati had taken by then and even to 
be competing with it so as to be the first CMA in the country (interview 69). Similarly, KZN 
province used to be one of the leading provinces in terms of CMAs establishment process 
with an establishment process which started around 2000s. However, here too, this early 
start did not lead to a successful -i.e. complete- establishment.  
 Instrumental role of organized agricultural interests: 
 
                                                          
4
 considering its situation in the economic hub of the country and the fact that water demand was growing 
there 
5
 Let us specify that each time we use the terminology “pioneer” or “early” to characterize some CMA 
establishment processes, those terms have to be understood relatively, i.e. in relation to other CMA 
establishment processes and not in absolute term. 
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Having mentioned these potential limits and the cautiousness with which our results 
should be taken, it appears quite clearly though that the role of commercial farmers has 
been confirmed as a critical element in the establishment process of CMAs (Inkomati; 
BOCMA; CWM). Either from the very start or along the way, it seems to have played a major 
role in facilitating an earlier establishment of CMAs. In contrast, the active role of other 
identified “big players” such as Eskom or the mining sector for instance could not be 
demonstrated in the preliminary phase of the establishment process. In CWM area, mining 
representatives were reported missing quite a few water forums meetings (interviews 72, 
70, 76). The best evidence of Eskom not being especially instrumental in the setting-up of a 
CMA can be found in the comparison between Inkomati river basin and upper Vaal river 
basin. Eskom is heavily present in both basins, however despite the importance of Upper 
Vaal and the fact that it is a water-stressed catchment, no CMA or proto-CMA was given 
birth in Upper Vaal contrarily to Inkomati. The major difference between the two basins 
seems then to be that in one case, irrigator farmers are numerous (Inkomati), but not in the 
second (Upper Vaal) (interview 83).       
More precisely, it seems that beyond the presence of mere farmers, it is the existence of 
irrigation boards (IB) which is crucial in the Inkomati catchment. Indeed, it is where we can 
notice the structuring and organization of the irrigation activity into IBs that we found the 
most advanced or successful CMAs establishment process (see next tables).  
 
Provinces/WMA Nb of IBs 
Northern Cape 27 
Eastern Cape 13 
Free State 8 
KZN 31 
North West 20 
Western Cape 85 
  
(sources: DWA, GIS Department, personal communication May 2011) 
 
WMA Nb of IBs 
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Usutu to Mhlatuze (KZN) 7 
Tukela (KZN) 12 
Mvoti to Mzimkulu (KZN) 12 
Inkomati (Mpumalanga) 27 
BreedeOverBerg (WC) 58 
Gouritz (WC) 27 
(sources: DWA, GIS Department, personal communication May 2011)6 
 
According to these two tables, Inkomati in Mpumalanga and in Western Cape Gouritz and 
especially Breede Over Berg appear to be displaying the highest number of IBs relatively 
speaking. 
 
The explanation of the presence of organized irrigation activity is not necessarily to be found 
in a stronger willingness within the farming community to engage in collective action. Here it 
seems that farmers did engage in collective action out of necessity, rather than out of a 
particular sensibility for collective action and social mobilization coming from specific 
farmers’ personality and engagement in the first place. Indeed, it is much more the presence 
of external conditions that explains the level of commitment in these collective institutions: 
collective action in the irrigation sector would be a response to a particular landscape and 
climatic conditions, and/or a particular history outside the farming sector per se.  
In that respect, as a winter rainfall area, Breede over Berg had a lot of dams and schemes 
already coming from late 19th Century to the extent that IBs are said to lay “back to back” 
covering there the whole region. When an area is concerned with summer rainfalls, like for 
instance in KZN, there is no need for such big infrastructures and therefore no need for IBs 
to manage them. Indeed, in this province, only individual dams have been built over time. 
                                                          
6
 These figures are only partial. We could not find complete and consistent information concerning all the 
provinces.  Moreover these figures about the number of IBs does not sufficiently inform us on the strength of 
the IB (the number of members it represents, the scope of tasks undertaken, the water works that may belong 
to some of them, the money that the IB can rely on based on the water charges it can levy  etc ) which would 
have given us a better indication about the extent to which irrigated farming is “organized” within this or this 
WMA. For instance in the upper Mvoti catchment, one of our interviewees mentioned right away that his IB 
was just a “low key” one: never any works belonging to the IB (no dam built); very basic administrative fees 
(very small levy); no asset as a board (interview 15) 
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For these privately financed and privately owned infrastructures, only registration at DWA is 
compulsory, they are not controlled by IBs or WUAs like the irrigation farmers of other areas 
with fewer rainfalls throughout the year (interviews 15, 20, 26).  
In contrast, as a dry area with little summer rainfalls, Inkomati had to “develop” its rivers in 
order to allow for agriculture expansion in that region. On the contrary, the level of 
collective management of water resources in the absence of IBs is very low in most parts of 
KZN as a result in particular of different climatic conditions. In addition, another challenge in 
KZN lies in the fact that there is an extensive portion of the territory concerned by tribal land 
clearly demarcated from the rest and obeying to its own institutional arrangements.  
 
 The hypothesis on the other big players’ role disqualified: 
 
Apart from these IBs, other big players role was not confirmed: by deduction, we can 
say that Eskom did not play an instrumental role otherwise it would have done it as well in 
Upper Vaal where its presence is also very strong (interview 64). As a strategic user, Eskom is 
less impacted by a demand pressure over the water resources anyway. In drought periods, 
its needs will be catered for in priority.  
The commercial forestry sector seems to have played an important role at the WUA level –
especially with the Elands River Catchment WUA, one out of the two new WUAs already 
running in Inkomati. However this involvement appeared to be related to a more personal 
commitment of the representative of the forestry sector to the objective of sustainable 
water resource management than to be a real mandate emanating from organizations in this 
sector. Considering now international players, it seems that international treaty obligations 
in terms of transboundary water was not the most critical point for Inkomati, otherwise 
Usutu to Mhlatuze CMA would have been established too because of its obligation to 
transfer water to Swaziland. Here again it seems that more importantly it is the presence of 
South African irrigation farmers having resettled across the border in Mozambique 
(interview 81) which matters –the same relocation phenomenon could not be observed 
across the border in North KZN-. 
As for conservation interests it seems that there was no real active involvement in CMAs 
establishment efforts, only a broad support to the initiative. More generally, SANpark 
organization usually does not invest much outside the boundary of natural reserves 
(personal communication with an expert of CMA establishment process, University of KZB, 
Pietermaritzburg), apart from a few exceptions like the involvement by the Kruger National 
Park in the technical Crocodile River Operating Committee (CROC) committee investigating 
real-time water flow measurement. Tourism industry also has a strong interest in making 
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sure that water resources are preserved. However it does not weight as much economically 
as the mining sector which is a bigger employer in any case, and so far as an indirect water 
user and polluter remains not so much involved in water resource management.  
In most areas under this study, local governments seemed to be facing other major 
challenges regarding water service delivery, preventing them from participating more deeply 
into upstream decision-level regarding water resource management. The fact that there are 
prospects in BOCMA to transfer water from the river basin to Cape Town as part of the 
National Water Resources Strategy (interview 34) could have been a decisive point in 
selecting this WMA as a priority region. Yet during our field work in the area nothing 
confirmed the specific role of Cape Town municipality in the establishment process. 
Moreover, in other river basins like Mvoti or CWM where powerful municipalities are 
present (Durban; Pretoria and Johannesburg), this does not seem to have made any 
difference so as to obtain a hastily establishment process. Idem for emerging farmers since 
the land reform is experiencing heavy backlogs.   
 
Factors facilitating CMAs ‘continued post-establishment process 
 
 Commercial farmers’ interested commitment: 
 
It is also worth questioning what prompted a change in the attitude of commercial 
farmers and IBs towards CMAs institutions over time. Indeed, as Brown and Woodhouse 
notice, IBs first attitude towards the 1998 NWA was about showing strong reluctance: 
“The IBs felt that DWAF forced through the proposal without “people on board” *…+, it was 
“bulldozed through” *…+ Commercial farmers, seemingly in a powerful negotiating position, 
being the largest water users with the best knowledge of the resource situation feel that they 
are inadequately represented and thus do not see the CMA process as having legitimacy. The 
source of money to maintain the CMA operations, after an initial one-off allocation from 
central government, will be the Water Resource Management Charge (WRMC). As the 
largest water user, commercial farmers have potentially considerable financial leverage over 
the CMA process. As a protest against what they see as “Taxation without 
representation”*…], most of the IBs contacted were withholding payment of the charge.” 
(Brown and Woodhouse 2004) (p.44)  
 
Indeed, as the authors rightly emphasize: “it is important to recognise that established 
patterns of water use are already based on local management systems, albeit ones that have 
historically favoured only a minority of the population. It is clear that for existing local water 
management agencies, such as the Irrigation Boards, the reform of water management is 
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perceived as taking power from local to central level *…]many IBs see the CMA process as a 
centralisation of power” (Brown and Woodhouse 2004) (p.46 and 49) 
 
Over time however, IBs and irrigator farmers started to see the benefits they could get in 
adhering to CMAs. With the NWA switching from riparian rights to the government as the 
new custodian of water resources, water allocation and licenses have now to be issued by 
the ministry. A lot of commercial white farmers perceived the new DWA staff as less 
favorable to their interests and because of this new distrust towards the administration, 
thought about the CMA as a potential alternative to circumvent the alleged bottleneck 
noticed at the DWA level when it comes to granting permits to white farmers (interviews 13, 
29, 30,31, 32, 76).  
Another potential advantage linked to the setting-up of the CMA was mentioned by another 
interviewee. According to a board member representing industry and mining, currently 
there is a new proposed approach pertaining to water use tariff determination and 
collection that could be experimented in Inkomati. With the delegation on new powers to 
the ICMA this responsibility will soon be transferred to Inkomati CMA. The tariff price would 
be set at a stakeholders meeting in a bottom-up approach based on the budget of the 
business plan approved at the meeting by stakeholders. In that respect, it was pointed out 
that Eskom as about one of the major water users in the WMA who use about 100 million m3 
of water per annum should be in a position to say what it wants for the money paid and as 
such could demand that there requests are put in the business plan (interview 64). This 
provision could interest the other stakeholders as well who could also think that by setting 
the price themselves, they will be able to hold the ICMA accountable for its performance. 
This complaint about being compelled to pay a substantial water charge to the DWA without 
the DWA feeling indebted in return to the tax payers for delivering services (such as 
removing alien species; constructing weirs; putting flow meters and monitoring points in 
rivers etc) is widespread among commercial farmers nowadays (interview 71). 
 
Finally, another benefit of setting-up a CMA from the commercial farmers’ perspective can 
be found in the prospects for establishing a river flow monitoring system together with staff 
of the ICMA. Indeed, IBs have a strong interest in being able to determine water availability 
in rivers. This is necessary to anticipate future droughts but it is also being used in order to 
operate the ecological reserve7 through a real-time monitoring software that can be more 
                                                          
7
 According to the 1998 Water Act part 3 which deals with the Reserve, the Reserve “[…] consists of two parts - 
the basic human needs reserve and the ecological 
reserve. The basic human needs reserve provides for the essential needs of individuals served by the water 
resource in question and includes water for drinking, for food preparation and for personal hygiene. The 
ecological reserve relates to the water required to protect the aquatic ecosystems of the water resource.” 
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precise than the devices and techniques used by the DWA to determine it (Interview 13). 
This tight collaboration between IBs’ information systems and one ICMA’s highly-qualified 
staff member has been experimented in the Crocodile sub-catchment. It has enabled a win-
win situation to occur within the so-called “CROC committee”: since in most of the cases the 
refined ecological reserve is recalibrated in a less drastic way, irrigators can quite happily 
end up being less restricted on their water abstractions. Other advantages can also be 
mentioned: cost-wise, IBs which highly needed these information concerning water 
availability in rivers were better off by pooling their efforts and means and “commissioning” 
the ICMA to do the job; ICMA staff can gain critical information that used to be centralized at 
the IBs’ level exclusively and demonstrates that it can perform a task that even the DWA was 
not able to undertake till now.  
 A supporting role from agri-business: ensuring a collaboration between commercial 
and emerging farmers 
 
Agri-business and especially the sugar cane industry in Inkomati has been confirmed to have 
played a supporting role on the side of agricultural organized interests, preparing the ground 
for a smoother collaboration between commercial and emerging sugar cane growers. This 
role played by the sugar cane industry was not instrumental in the establishment process of 
the Inkomati CMA per se but it has the potential to play a major role in the CMA post-
establishment process, especially by easing the relationship between emerging and 
commercial farmers, a relationship that could potentially become rather contentious in the 
future, therefore undermining the functioning of the CMA governing board.  
Transvaal Sugar Limited (TSB)8 is a sugar cane processing industry installed in the Nkomazi 
region –located within the Komati sub-catchment (one of the three Inkomati sub-
catchments)-. TSB has a record of being very active in the organization of a strong 
collaboration among its raw product suppliers, i.e. between black emerging cane growers 
and white commercial ones. TSB’s involvement can be explained by a combination of factors 
pertaining among other things to the pace of land reform implementation. The Nkomazi is 
situated in an area of former tribal land. A land claim process covering 10,000 Ha could 
therefore be completed quite quickly thanks to the fact that despite the huge proportion of 
territory concerned, only one claimant –the traditional authority- was involved in the 
procedure, which was subsequently facilitated9. Arable land exploited by white sugar cane 
                                                          
8
 a wholly owned subsidiary of Remgro– a diversified company listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange 
in South Africa  
9
 The land reform covers a three-tiered approach: first there is the land restitution whose aim is to return land 
that was taken away forcibly from black people during apartheid, or to provide those affected with financial 
compensation; there is the land redistribution process which aims to equitably share resources by transferring 
 © Bourblanc, 2011, Safewater-Arise project Page 16 
 
growers had to be redistributed to emerging black farmers.  Located in the area where TSB 
mill operates, this was causing a big challenge to the company whose objective is to be able 
to secure the tonnage it needs in order to maintain its profits. Indeed, as one of our 
interviewees put it “a mill interest is simple: the way a mill works is very capital intensive, if 
the mill is running 100%, you make a lot of money, if production drops to 70%, it is just going 
under, there is no profit left any more, because fixed costs are taking all your profits. So you 
have to get above 70%, otherwise you have to close the mill.” (interview 50). It is not very 
clear what prompted this pro-activeness: perhaps because of the existence of a sugar cane 
supply contract between the former farmer and the mill, it is possible that TSB was not able 
to get away with this contract once the farm was bought out, but either way TSB felt that the 
company had no other choice but to get involved in the transition from commercial to 
emerging sugar cane estates, for instance by requesting commercial farmers to train the 
new comers, by easing the relationship between the two groups within the mill, or within 
the irrigation board in which TSB staff holds some responsibilities10 so as to make sure the 
collaboration between the two groups would be smooth (interview 50). In other words, TSB 
got involved in all the relevant activities in order to make sure that emerging cane growers 
would succeed in taking over the commercial farm. Here we see a virtuous circle effect, the 
redistribution of land national policy triggering the strong involvement of the sugar cane 
industry in the sugar cane growers’ affairs and interactions within the Komati area.  
The pro-active role of TSB –despite the triggering role of the land redistribution reform- 
should not be downplayed however. Indeed, this tight involvement and collaboration with 
the different profiles of sugar cane growers was not displayed in the Usutu to Mhlatuze 
WMA however despite similar conditions, i.e. an area concerned with massive redistribution 
of sugar cane land to the dispossessed black community. The sugar cane industry is 
dominated there by the Tongaat-Hulett company. Unlike TSB, Tongaat-Hulett did not want 
to get involved and facilitate the transition from sugar cane land farmed by commercial 
irrigators to land farmed by emerging sugar cane growers despite the fact that here too the 
sugar cane industry is very much concerned with securing its supply to the mill. No joint 
venture with the black farmers for instance was created. It was alleged that the culture of 
the two sugar cane companies was differing quite substantially with TSB being closer to 
farming activities and understanding pretty well that growing sugar cane could not be 
improvised and that it would require a lot of accompaniment and training for new comers. 
On the contrary, with a more corporate culture within Tongaat-Hulett Tongaat-Hulett 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
land from white to black people so that the land ownership share of black people is increased; there is the 
tenure reform which aims to enhance the tenure security of vulnerable people, such as workers and their 
families residing on private commercial farms as well as people living in the former homelands. 
 
10
 TSB director used to be the chairperson of the Komati River IB 
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managers have a tendency to be more remote from farming realities and thus did not 
anticipate the difficulties that land redistribution to emerging cane growers in their area 
could provoke for their business. In fine, Tongaat-Hulett did not adopt the same pro-active 
role towards the farming community as in the TSB case.  
 
Challenges facing the CMAs’ functioning 
 
Based on our observations of two CMAs –ICMA and BOCMA- we will consider first the 
challenges facing CMAs and related to internal functioning, then we will expose the 
challenges related to a lack of coordination across institutions. 
 
 Internal functioning of CMAs 
 
We could have expected some tensions between emerging farmers and commercial ones, 
considering the fact that redistribution of water allocation to the benefit of new comers in 
the farming sector could potentially be done at the expense of already-established farmers. 
Yet, it seems that so far there is no need to consider the option of curtailing on commercial 
farmers’ former water rights, among other things because new comers in the sector are still 
not really numerous. Nevertheless, apart from this potential difficulty that seems to have 
been circumvented so far, other challenges relate to the composition mode of CMA’s 
governing board: 
 
 Composition mode of the CMAs’ governing board 
 
One major difficulty concerns the determination of which stakeholders should be 
represented in the governing board. For instance, considering the political game surrounding 
water service delivery (water board etc), one has to be aware of the necessity not to 
amalgamate water board and municipalities/water services authorities. Illustrating such 
political stakes, we could observe in KZN the refusal of an Inkata Freedom Party-run district 
municipality to get a water board controlled by DWA and more broadly by a national 
government ruled by the ANC (interview 25). This national-local politician conflict can also 
be seconded by a more strictly local politician battle among competitors from the same 
political party like it is the case in Mpumalanga province and Bushbuckridge municipality in 
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particular. Bushbuckridge water board is indeed suffering from financial difficulties caused 
by the reluctance of Bushbuckridge municipality to pay all its debt to the water board 
providing bulk purified water to the municipality which then has to reticulate it to domestic 
users. This reluctance is not linked to financial difficulties coming from the municipality only 
but to mistrust between the two organizations, the municipality perceiving the governing 
board of the water board whose members are appointed by the DWA minister as political 
competitors in their constituency area (interviews 44, 46). Moreover, Bushbuckridge water 
board also complains about the unfair strategy that the Mbombela municipality is allegedly 
using against itself, again making use of the financial weapon in order to get rid of the water 
board and preparing the terrain for the privately-owned water service delivery company11.  
Therefore, in order to avoid confusing different interests there is a need to get a different 
seat for each of these different interests (water boards and municipalities) within the 
governing board. Ignoring this kind of stakes and in general misjudging the actors’ 
configuration and play could lead to substantial problems like the ones experienced in 
Crocodile West and Marico during the water forum phase. At first both emerging and 
commercial farmers, but also competing agricultural associations etc were amalgamated 
under the common label of agricultural interests, but this proved to have a counter-
mobilizing effect on the different participants at this early stage of CMA establishment 
process, therefore delaying the whole process (interview 72). 
Besides these difficulties concerning the generic composition of a governing board, there are 
other difficulties related to the designation of individuals incarnating the representation of 
such and such stakeholders group. It seems that very often the designation of such 
personalities has been the occasion for political games to interfere into the process here as 
well. It was particularly striking in our observation of the CWM case and the ICMA. In that 
respect, these political games can correspond to stakes pertaining to various dimensions. 
First, there is the one related to representation proportion with the objective of making sure 
that the majority within the governing board will be granted to former disadvantaged groups 
or on the contrary to former benefiting portions of the population (interview 70). Besides 
this racially-based kind of politics, there is sometimes another political dimension expressing 
itself and that is linked to politics, i.e. to political parties. The intent of political parties here is 
to ensure that their specific representation together with their particular policy agenda will 
be supported within the governing board. Finally, there is a dimension attached to the 
political clientele. By nominating personalities that are closed to one’s political party 
network, the idea here is not to defend particular policy priorities but to reward the 
faithfulness or allegiance of individuals to the political network. This last possibility is 
particularly detrimental to CMA’s specific mandate since these individuals do not have any 
particular interest in the objectives to be achieved by the CMAs. However, the second type is 
                                                          
11
 the municipality is in contract with - Silulumansi-Sembcorp- (interview 11) 
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also impeding on the progress of the CMA mandate which cannot be linked to the evolving 
policy agenda of a particular political party. Indeed the CMA specific mandate constitutes a 
national priority already adopted and applicable to all citizens. Lastly, the struggle of either 
previously advantaged or disadvantaged groups to control the governing board composition 
is problematic in order to secure the balanced representation that is needed for the CMA to 
get the relevant stakeholders’ interests represented and to be able to see its policies being 
implemented. Moreover, some specific areas like in Mpumalanga for instance have inherited 
from the past political regimes a particular way of dividing and segregating the black 
communities into neighboring but separate tribal territories. As a result, division between 
ethnic groups located on the same perimeter and for our concern, sharing the same river 
basin is higher than in other places also characterized by former territorial segregation in 
South Africa. This feature has produced long-lasting effects which still impact on the way 
political life is conducted in the region, not so much because of the authority still granted to 
the traditional leaders by their “subjects” but because of the attachment to the use of a 
specific language that distinguishes these different ethnic groups. Although it does not often 
openly acknowledge it, the ruling party for instance recognizes the necessity of 
accommodating these ethnic sensibilities in the way it conceives its electoral campaign and 
strategy in the region (interview 61). Talking about the necessity to ensure a wide diversity 
of interests represented within the governing board, this aspect needs to be reflected as 
well in the composition of the governing board in order to facilitate the feeling of belonging 
of the river basin inhabitants towards the CMA institution.  However, according to one of our 
interviewees, it seems that probably because of a lack of awareness this important 
dimension has been largely overlooked in the selection of the ICMA next governing board 
adopted by the advisory committee and recommended to the Minister for future 
appointment (interview 64).  
The selection of the governing board members is therefore a sensitive operation to conduct, 
one that should deserve the biggest attention in order to avoid some of the traps mentioned 
above. The easy way out in order to escape the politics involved in the appointment of 
governing board members seems to be trying ignoring the political dimension of the 
governing board arena (“political” here in the sense of “polity”). However we believe this is a 
mistake: the CMA cannot escape this political –broadly defined- dimension if it wants to be 
able to treat the issues it will have to face as we will see in the next sections. In that respect, 
favoring competence over representativeness as it seems to be the case for the list selected 
by the Inkomati advisory committee for the renewal of the CMA governing board is 
problematic (interview 64).  
 
 Commitment and accountability of the governing board’s members: 
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The composition of the CMA governing board is a crucial element that should be easing the 
commitment of its members to the task to be achieved within the CMA. Considering the 
complexity of water issues, governing board commitment is largely depending upon the 
capacity of its members to participate into the discussions from a technical perspective. In 
that respect, it has already been mentioned several times that some stakeholders in 
particular benefit from substantial discursive advantages in the debate : “Well resourced 
stakeholders, such as forestry, mining, sugar and metropolitan municipalities have 
demonstrated their superior leverage through effective scientific, economic and legal advice, 
leaving marginalised groups such as emerging farmers behind. Efforts should be directed 
towards balancing the scales of knowledge equity.” (Asnar and Hansen 2009), p.8). The 
current functioning of ICMA is confirming this feature with commercial farming, electricity 
production and tourism interests’ representatives (to mention just a few) dominating the 
exchanges while Historically Disadvantaged Individuals representative, Civics representative,  
and informal settlements’ representative in particular have a tendency to remain rather 
passive (interviews 43 and 51). This alleged passivity may be linked to a low level of 
confidence –that we could also observed (interviews 37, 39, 51)- due to lower levels of 
knowledge on water resources and to a great extent differences in educational levels among 
board members. 
Nevertheless, this passivity mentioned several times during our interviews in the Inkomati 
catchment is especially striking when compared to empirical literature on the broad 
consultation phase prior to the CMA official establishment. Indeed Anderson evokes the fact 
that : “During the participatory process there was a lack of clarity on important data such as 
the water balance (reconciliation of water requirements and water availability) for the 3 sub-
catchments. This created tension between stakeholders as each sector blamed the other for 
water scarcity and over-allocations. “(Anderson 2005), p.5). This statement contrasts very 
much with the current situation that we observed during our field work in Inkomati river 
basin in which no such tension could be observed. This should be an encouraging statement 
if we could attribute it to the pacification of the relations among various stakeholders and to 
a social learning process on how to exchange in a constructive way over difficult issues. 
However it seems that it is much more attributable to the fact that stakeholders’ 
representatives are not always engaging with the major challenges facing water resources 
management in the river basin and have a tendency to overlook the crucial stakes that 
should be debated within the CMA. Indeed, it seems that the lack of tensions is best 
explained by the fact that contentious subjects are avoided within the governing board 
meetings even during strategic discussions like the one over the CMS drafting. Such a gap 
between stakeholders’ preoccupations and their representatives raises the question of 
representativeness of the governing board members and their legitimacy to voice the 
concerns of the population that they are supposed to be speaking on behalf of and being 
accountable to. To combat such problems, continuous efforts have to be dedicated to the 
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training of governing board members –as well as staff like in the EU-funded training initiative 
with the Dutch Groot Salland water board- so as to ensure proper empowerment and to 
circumvent having any intimidated member not daring raising its voice during meetings.  
Apart from the necessity for all the governing board members to level up to the technical 
knowledge required in order to actively participate into the discussion, we found counter-
productive the decision taken by ICMA governing board to self-allocate a stipend almost 
amounting to a salary to its members. Indeed, the prospect of receiving a salary out of one’s 
participation into the governing board gives very bad incentives. The Crocodile West and 
Marico water forums process illustrate that point particularly well. Indeed, according to 
several of our interviewees, “once people realized they wouldn’t get paid, they disappeared, 
the consultation process had to start all over again, amounting to big delays in the 
establishment process of the CMA and to the exasperation of other members” (interview 72).  
The prospects of getting paid for participating in the process tend to attract the wrong 
candidates for stakeholders representation. Making things clearer about money prospects 
from the very start could help avoid these misunderstandings and delays in the selection of 
truly motivated participants in the consultation process. Even for population categories 
struggling with the necessity to make a decent living, participating into the CMA governing 
board cannot be perceived as a way to get a revenue. On the contrary, it has to be 
considered as a volunteer work. As a consequence, only a small stipend covering extra-costs 
of participation to 4 meetings/year (transport expenditures; food expenditures etc) should 
be allowed like in the case of BOCMA. This is a way of preventing any conflict of interests 
between members who could be tempted to censor their (constructive) critical thought 
about the CMA’s agenda or to be overtly laudatory about CMA’s program of actions because 
of their fear to undermine the organization that ensures their very subsistence. 
 
 Sharing of responsibilities between staff and governing board: 
 
Another difficult challenge is linked to the necessity to ensure a proper sharing of 
responsibilities between CMA’s governing board and its staff. As a preamble, we should 
emphasize the importance for a CMA to be able to rely on qualified staff. In that respect, it is 
obvious that the demonstration of specific competence held by certain ICMA staff members 
tremendously accelerated the process of functions delegation to ICMA. Indeed, a well-
capacitated CMA  that can prove that it can operate without the help of external consultants 
is a critical advantage. No doubt that in the ICMA case, the fact that ICMA could draft a CMS 
in-house without external support was an element of trust between ICMA and the DWA 
minister encouraging her to eventually agree on a first set of delegated functions. 
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Nevertheless, without downplaying the importance of the supporting staff competency, one 
should be clear about the division of tasks between CMA decisional body –governing board- 
and CMA’s officials whose role is to execute the measures adopted by the governing board 
only. Therefore, its responsibility is to assist the governing board in the performance of its 
tasks, not to take over it. In particular, the drafting of the CMS cannot be undertaken for its 
most part by the staff leaving the governing board to only register options that have been 
put on the agenda by another body, here the CMA staff. In that respect, conversely to what 
was exposed by one interviewee, the CMS is not a mere “practical document”, positioning 
itself very “far away from politics” (interview 13). Indeed, the NWA mentions that a CMS will 
include for instance a water allocation plan and that it must set principles for allocating 
water to existing and prospective users, taking into account all matters relevant to the 
protection, use, development, conservation, management and control of water resources 
(see chapter 2 part 2, NWA).  
Several reasons can be mentioned that explained why it is not satisfactory to let the CMA 
officials take priority over the governing board discussion on the matter, one of them being 
the potential structural bias of the staff towards commercial farming already mentioned in 
the literature (Brown and Woodhouse 2004), p.14), i.e. the fact that CMA officials’ job 
security depends on financial resources that will be mainly provided –at least in the early 
stages- by the commercial farmers12. Consequently, in order to avoid any conflicts of 
interest, political decisions such as the ones enclosed in a CMS have to remain under the 
responsibility of the governing board as indicated in the Law.  
Regarding the CMS drafting, the approach evoked by BOCMA comes closer to the procedural 
steps that are supposed to be followed. BOCMA staff did not take for granted that the 
governing board should be the only media through which the different stakeholders groups 
can express their opinion. Therefore it was both water forums and a reference group 
(composed of 18 members, some of them belonging to the governing board as well but not 
only) who are currently writing the CMS. It is not the unique responsibility of the governing 
board. Indeed it is conceived as a bottom-up process in which the CMA must get inputs from 
grass-roots organizations, then leaving the governing board with the final approval. In 
contrast, the approach followed by ICMA was getting closer to a top-down process in which 
the idea for the CMA is just to go back to stakeholders so that it “can educate people” 
(interview).  
To restitute into details the CMS drafting process in Inkomati, let us mention that the in-
house drafting of the Inkomati CMS was a responsibility that was given to the Water 
Resource Planning and Programmes unit of Inkomati CMA. It was done in such a way that 
                                                          
12
 So far the Inkomati CMA has two funding sources: first a parliamentary allocation which comes from 
government coffers and second, external funding that comes from the donor community. 
 © Bourblanc, 2011, Safewater-Arise project Page 23 
 
first the executive manager of the planning unit had to buy into the board the idea of 
drafting the Inkomati CMS in-house. The governing board agreed and gave consent to the 
planning unit to go ahead with the idea. Subsequently, the planning unit developed the 
Inkomati CMS to its final logical conclusion by building on the status quo report that was 
produced by consultants who were initially engaged by DWA to draft the CMS for the 
Inkomati CMA. 
 
Yet, the approach chosen by BOCMA with a clear division of tasks between the governing 
board “giving overall direction of the company” and “the officials who are doing the 
operational work” is not without posing problems itself. This idea of the governing board 
“not zooming-in and only having a helicopter view, nothing very detailed” whereas “the staff 
has to put into technical and sensible wordings *…+ the strategic direction given by the board” 
(interview 26) is not completely satisfactory. Indeed, it tends to ignore the fact that technical 
decisions are seldom neutral and always involves a political dimension (Lascoumes and Le 
Galès 2007). Therefore, the technical part cannot be left to the staff alone, but the governing 
board must also check on this aspect. Furthermore, the duty and function of the staff is also 
to tell what the technical implications of a decision are, therefore putting the governing 
board in a position to take an informed decision. In a sum, if we advocate for a proper 
sharing of responsibilities between CMA staff and governing board, this cannot take the 
form of a division between strategic direction on the one hand and technical application on 
the other hand since we know that this division and categories are not that clear-cut in 
reality. The CMA’s staff should strive to stay the mere executing body of the governing board 
decision and not to get involved in the decision-making process, only to bring its technical 
insights up-stream in the decision-making process so as to make the deliberation of the 
governing board more informed. Again the technical translation of decisions taken by the 
governing board cannot be differed to downstream decision-making only, i.e. the 
implementation phase whose responsibility is given to the CMA’ staff.  
 
 
 Two competing paradigms ruling the CMAs: a managerial one and a social 
transformation one 
We make the hypothesis that one possible explanation for such a mix of roles between the 
staff and the governing board is related to the confusion over the ultimate identity of a CMA. 
Indeed, granting CMA officials too many actual responsibilities leads to minimizing the 
political dimension of the CMA mandate. Again, what we mean by “political” here has little 
to do with “political party politics” but refers much more to the “polity” dimension of the 
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term, i.e. a reference to an arena for debate and confrontation of opinions in which different 
interests and positions have to be accommodated. Considering the challenges facing the 
CMAs –one of which being in a near future about issuing licenses and presiding over water 
(re)-allocation issues-, this dimension should not be downplayed. Indeed, numerous works 
mention the fact that inequalities are still vivid almost two decades after the end of 
Apartheid. In rural areas for instance, it takes the form of territorial overcrowding and land 
deprivation resulting from the Apartheid era. Against this background, access to water 
displays the most striking inequalities of all the policy sectors: white, large-scale farmers, 
consumed as much as 95 per cent of water for irrigation while smallholders, mainly black 
farmers, share the remaining 5 per cent (Schreiner and Van Koppen 2002; Cullis and Van 
Koppen 2007). Considering the stakes involved, the water sector appears as a very symbolic 
issue in the struggle to redeem the past and rebuild the Nation around the achievement of a 
successful water policy reform. In that respect and in order to remedy identified backlog in 
the implementation of the redistributive agenda, the Water Allocation Reform (WAR) 
Strategy of 2008 states that by 2014, 30% of allocable water should be to the benefit of 
Black people. By 2024 the target is 60%, of which half should be under control of black 
women.  
In this struggle for social transformation, not only will critical functions be partly delegated 
to CMAs like the one about water (re-)allocation, but the CMA will have to figure out some 
unresolved dimensions within the Act. Indeed, the redistributive objective is not the only 
agenda to which is committed the CMAs: the NWA contains other principles that seem to be 
difficult to reconcile with one another. For instance, the Act talks about the need to address 
both the issue of equity and at the same time the economic issue of water productivity. 
According to this latter principle, people demonstrating the most productive uses of water 
should retain their user’ rights meaning that existing lawful water users who are making 
efficient use of water and contributing to socio-economic growth would not be curtailed. 
How, in a water scarce country, this principle is going to be accommodated with the 
objective of enabling a more equitable access to water resources or with the objective of 
alleviating poverty in rural areas where people engage in subsistence agriculture, remains 
unanswered. Movik (Movik 2009) is rather pessimistic about the outcome of the 
confrontation of such principles and argues that in practice “the existing users [are the ones] 
entrenched, and the case for redistribution to historically disadvantaged individuals (HDI) [is] 
tightly tied to their potential for economic productivity” (p.11). Other authors (Schreiner, Van 
Koppen et al. 2002) also underline the apparent incompatibility of these NWA objectives and 
emphasize the need for specifying in particular the economic concept: quoting Perry et al. 
(Perry, Rock et al. 1997), these authors recall that following one of Dublin main principles 
(1992), the statement that water should be treated as an economic good has “the virtue of 
being sufficiently vague to allow agreement, while leaving the implied operational content – 
over which there may be strong disagreement – unstated”. Schreiner et al. continue: 
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“Instead, as Perry et al (1997) argue, the issue is not whether water is an economic good as it 
is, but what kind of economic good water is, a private or public and social good, and hence 
which values govern analysis and decision-making. Proponents of water as a private good 
define its value as the maximum amount that the user would be willing to pay for the use of 
the resource. The distribution of water should be determined by the overriding value (and not 
more than a value) of the consumer’s sovereignty on a free market “ (p.133). Finally, 
emphasizing how much this conception is at odds with the current social transformation 
agenda of the NWA, they advocate for a paradigm shift in the implementation of the NWA 
moving away from the “conventional water management paradigm”  (p.133). 
 
In any case, solving the uncertainties and approximations of the NWA Act implies having a 
political debate within the CMA that the application of mere managerial recipes within the 
CMA cannot provide. Since those objectives do not come as straightforward as we could 
have expected, running a CMA cannot be considered as a purely managerial task. On the 
contrary, these competing objectives need an adequate and open deliberation and 
arbitration. This is a very demanding process that requires engaging with the political 
dimension and abandoning this conception of the CMA as a mere “company”, a terminology 
that has often been used by several of our interviewees (interviews 26, 64, 17). Likewise, the 
use by several of our interviewees of the term “customers” to designate the water 
stakeholders (Interviews 17 and 64) reveals the particular mind set in which is perceived the 
work of a CMA. We believe this plays against the objective of ensuring social transformation 
in the water sector.  
To some extent, it seems that this “company” vocabulary has to do with the concern about 
the financial sustainability of the CMA organization. However, if securing its economic 
sustainability is an important pre-requisite of the capacity of a CMA to fulfill its mission, yet 
it cannot pass as its ultimate goal. Indeed, it remains that the prime focus of the governing 
board is to ensure the “integrated water resource management”(Schreiner, Van Koppen et 
al. 2002) (p.139), a task that involves among other things to look at water (re-)allocation and 
water scarcity management.  
Therefore, in order to address this social transformation agenda, one has to conceive of the 
CMA as a political arena, not as a private and/or technical organization whose raison d’être 
is to deliver services for its “clients”. For this reason, a careful selection of the governing 
board is needed both to avoid selecting passive/non-dedicated members to its political 
agenda as well as to avoid the easy solution which would be to select governing board 
members based on their sole competence, i.e mere experts of water issues who do not 
benefit from a political legitimacy within the group they will represent13. 
                                                          
13
 The approach that has been proposed by the Inkomati advisory committee for the renewal of the governing 
board 
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Likewise, the request from particular sectors which hold a representation in the current 
governing board, to set the water charge fees in a bottom-up approach, based on the 
willingness to pay of the water stakeholders is problematic from the same viewpoint. One of 
our interviewee (interview 64) claimed that under the new approach, if water users were 
prepared to pay an increase in the water tariff, it will have to be based on what the CMA can 
deliver to them, like if they were CMA’s mere clients. Yet the idea of decentralizing water 
governance at the river basin level and asking the various stakeholders to participate into 
the decision-making has been conceived of in order to better adapt decisions to the local 
context and not to give the opportunity to these stakeholders to redefine the national water 
policy agenda so as to suit their particular needs. Here stakeholders have to respond to 
national objectives, they are not supposed to be only seeking their own individual interests. 
This remark is even more important when stakeholders perceive themselves as clients of 
these organizations and when the risk of capture of these organizations by particular 
stakeholders is high like in our case.  
 
 Policy coordination across institutions 
 
 DWA regional offices’ future role 
  
Finally throughout our series of interviews we could sense some concern coming from the 
members of DWA regional offices (RO) about their role and duties in this new organizational 
architecture. Officially RO’s function is to help “coordinate and facilitate the decentralization 
process” (interview 17), and a lot of them claim having played an instrumental role in the 
early establishment of a CMA in their responsible territory. This leadership role at the 
inception of CMA’s establishment process has often been disputed by other actors being 
interviews, but what seems to be more problematic today is the attitude of a number of ROs 
towards CMAs even in the most advanced establishment and delegation processes. 
Apparently if it were there at the beginning of the process, the support of RO seems to have 
decreased over time.  This has not so much to do with the redefinition of its missions that 
this former “hydrocracy” (Molle, Mollinga et al. 2009) has to assume14. Indeed since 1998 
                                                          
14
 For Molle et al., hydrocracies refer to powerful state water bureaucracies created in the late 19
th
 century 
across the world: “Because of the financial failure of private enterprises and various national objectives, the 
states *…+ stepped in and endorsed the role of (large‐scale) developer of water resources. Imbued with the fresh 
legitimacy of technical marvels (high dams, electricity, etc) and the presumably unlimited power of science, 
inspired by the mission to tame nature and make the deserts bloom, hydraulic bureaucracies were created to 
take up the challenges of flood protection, hydropower generation and large‐scale public irrigation. These 
bureaucracies had their secular priesthoods, acting in the name of the common good and in tandem with 
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the ministry and its regional offices have had to undertake a couple of reforms which saw 
the institution at first grow to encompass forestry, water service delivery, environmental 
affairs with a massive transfer of staff to the organization to a return to a more normal size 
for the organization however with only a minor part of its personnel corresponding to 
previous engineering tasks. Therefore to some extent the institution is now used to go 
through important transformations and has proven to some extent its resilience so far. 
However what seems more problematic in the present context is the feeling of being 
deprived of any responsibility left. Some of our interviewees mentioned their fear of being 
considered as no more than a mere “post-office” between the two decisive institutions that 
are the DWA national office and the CMAs, understanding that in the longer run their 
institution is threatened just because cost-wise having three institutions performing tasks 
that used to be performed by only two of them will appear eventually problematic to the 
Legislator (interview 65). With staff member of another RO, we could feel that his 
perception of the future situation would also be a “either-or”, either there will be a regional 
office or there will be a CMA (interview 74). Moreover, the perceived job-insecurity attached 
to the CMAs for which nobody knows as yet if they will be financially sustainable 
organizations does not motivate the RO staff to make the choice of being transferred to 
CMAs. Against this background, it is not surprising that most of the CMAs governing board 
mentioned the fact that RO staff always finds various excuses not to delegate functions to 
CMAs, using according to our CMAs’ members undeserved allegations of under-
performance. 
Therefore, in order to fight this reluctance and distrust towards CMAs, there is a need to 
clarify the future role of DWA Regional offices in this new institutional context. 
 
 The DWA not preparing the ground for the implementation of the social redress 
agenda 
The challenges facing the CMAs in their attempt to fulfill their mandate seem to be reflected 
in other institutions interacting with the CMAs. Indeed, some difficulties pertaining to the 
implementation of the social transformation objective of the NWA emanate from the DWA 
as well which proves to experience some problems with the necessity to be moving away 
from the status quo and putting the CMAs well on track to pursue their social redress task. 
Let us take for instance the case of water re-allocation, which is an objective of the NWA. 
This objective is part of the “compulsory licensing” process –i.e. the necessity for all water 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
politicians and national leaders. Not a single drop of water should reach the sea without being put to work for 
the benefit of Man: the 'hydraulic mission' was born.”  (p.332) 
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uses to get a water use authorization from the DWA-, which can only take place after a 
validation/verification process of “existing lawful water uses” has been completed. Our case 
studies in Usutu and in CWM suggest that DWA had the opportunity to curtail without too 
many difficulties or costs involved some of the previously tolerated water uses by 
commercial farmers, but decided not to seize that opportunity.  
First it is important to acknowledge the complexity of the first step in the process, i.e. the 
validation/verification process, one reason for such a complexity being that there is a 
knowledge gap between farmers or IBs and the DWA: indeed IBs are careful not to display 
especially to the DWA information they possess. Therefore very often the DWA civil servants 
experience an information deficit in front of IBs (interview 13). Actually, sometimes even IBs 
themselves do not know what were the legally registered water rights under the previous 
Water Act–not all farmers were belonging to an IB- and in general there are a lot of 
uncertainties surrounding previously authorized water rights. In cases for which IBs do not 
want to share the data that they own, DWA services have to use Landset satellite images and 
to run models used by the department of agriculture as well as data concerning crops and 
land surfaces (information about evaporation; rainfalls; climate; soil type; water required for 
each type of crop etc) in order to come to an estimation of these former water rights. With 
this broad estimation -which can never be 100% accurate-, DWA can have a good guess and 
a good starting point from which to negotiate with the farmers what has been their real use 
of water in the past.  
Yet the discussion can stumble against two other contentious points. One has to do with an 
“anomaly” of the former water Act regulating water uses on an hour and Ha basis, 
something that is linked to the fact that lawyers rather than hydrologists were ruling the 
water Courts that imposed this measure in the past. One of the new objectives of the DWA is 
to convert these authorized Hectares into authorized volumes in order to give better clarity 
about water uses15. However this provision is still challenged by some farmers.  
A second contentious matter between commercial farmers and DWA lies in the different 
interpretation that is given to the rule that defines the so-called “qualifying period” for 
determining existing lawful water uses. Indeed, while farmers talk about their water rights  
(interviews 13, 30, 31, 32, 76), in contrast DWA only talks about “existing lawful uses” 
following in that way the new Act terminology. The whole rationale behind determining 
“existing lawful uses” through a process of verification/validation is not for the DWA to grant 
people with definite rights. Indeed, such rights have been abolished with the public 
                                                          
15
 Indeed, depending on the pumping and spreading device used for irrigation, very different volumes can 
actually been consumed for  irrigation from one farmer to another even though they were granted the same Ha 
and Hour rights for irrigation. These Ha and Hour references are not precise enough, they do not say anything 
about the volumes of water actually used.  
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trusteeship of nation’s water resources under the custody of the Minister of water affairs16. 
Nevertheless, this change in the juridical situation (abolition of water rights) can give rights 
for the irrigators to financial compensation in case of potential cut-backs during the 
compulsory licensing process (see point 22 (6 and 7) chapter 4 of the NWA). We understand 
that if DWA wants to be able to adequately compensate irrigators in cases there would be a 
decrease between previous water uses (under the 1956 Act) and new authorized water uses 
as the result of the next step –compulsory licensing-, it needs to know what were these 
previous legal uses.  
In addition, the objective behind the verification/validation process is also to have some 
clarity about what volumes of water were actually used under the previous Act. Indeed, very 
often water rights were over-estimated in the past just to give the farmer some comfort and 
sufficient room for coping with potential future need –by that time the water needs of only a 
minority was recognized, so the issue of scarcity was not on the agenda yet-. Against this 
background, DWA works under the principle of “use it or lose it”, i.e. the fact that according 
to the law the only existing lawful water uses that are supposed to be recognized are the 
ones used two years before commencement of the new national Act, meaning between 
1996 and 1998. Therefore, this validation/verification process is an operation that intends to 
determine whether or not there has been some discrepancies between the declared rights 
and the right to water actually used. The idea with this “use it or lose it” principle is 
obviously to try to find an easy way to cut back on over-allocated rights. Accordingly, if for 
whatever reason, some water rights claimed by farmers were not used during that qualifying 
period, then they are deemed to be denied by the DWA. Since these rights have not been 
effectively used, it means that taking them away will not impact on the farmer current 
economic activity. However, in practice, it seems that DWA staff is very seldom taking 
advantage of these grey areas to negotiate some cut-backs with the farmers. Indeed, one of 
our interviews (interview 83) reveals that DWA’s attitude is very much accommodating with 
commercial farmers’ interests who did not use their rights during the qualifying period: their 
rights are not necessarily denied despite the fact they did not use it during the qualifying 
period. 
This feature is especially striking in the Mhlatuze catchment where a process of compulsory 
licensing is under way. This catchment has been selected as a priority zone for compulsory 
licensing because it has the reputation of being a water-stressed catchment but at the same 
time, it is a well-known fact that this water-stressed situation is principally virtual. Indeed, it 
is typically a river basin  in which water rights have been over-allocated to the point that the 
catchment is now referred to as a “paper stressed catchment” (interview 65). Here again, 
even though the qualifying period only showed 40% of effective use of existing lawful water 
                                                          
16
 The only rights that the NWA recognizes now are linked to the Reserve : basic human needs and the 
ecological reserve 
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uses, a compromise was reached that recognized up to 60% of farmers’ former “quotas” 
(interview 65). Yet this catchment had been especially selected to conduct the first 
compulsory licensing process with the purpose of cutting back on water demand on paper 
(interview 83). This could have been the perfect opportunity to cut back on more water 
quotas without almost any dispute and to provision them for future demand and 
redistribution, but instead DWA decided to secure the future needs of commercial farmers, 
following what DWA used to do prior NWA promulgation17.  
In some cases, this could be explained by the fact that in government water controlled 
irrigation scheme, a tariff was worked out based on the quotas, and in order for the ministry 
to secure the income and sustain the maintenance of the dams and schemes, you cannot 
reduce too much the water quotas unless you raise water tariff. However it is clear that this 
does not concern most of the situations. 
Likewise, it is symptomatic to note that apart from Mhlatuze catchment compulsory 
licensing has so far been foreseen only in regions where there are suspicions of a lot of 
illegal water uses (illegal connections) like in Upper Vaal. Thus, in the two pilot regions, 
compulsory licensing does not seem to be about implementing a redistributive agenda. The 
rationale behind appears to be much more about one of maintaining a status quo that 
continues benefiting commercial farmers. 
  
 
Finally, we could have mentioned several other challenges regarding across sectors’ 
coordination with institutions which are located outside the water sector, such as for 
instance the coordination between CMAs’ responsibilities and urban development, mining 
sites opening or progress of the land reform. Although the absence of such coordination is a 
real impediment to the smooth functioning of the CMAs, nevertheless we could not delve 
into these subjects within the time limit of this study.  
 
Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
 
                                                          
17
 In their chapter, Schreiner et al. (2002, op.cit.) mention the fact that “in the Mhlatuze basin, around 10% of 
the people, typically the most affluent, use 99% of the available water resources”. (p.129) 
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Considering the difficulties encountered in conducting the study, we have both investigated 
CMAs’ establishment process and post-establishment one, studying the current functioning 
of two of these CMAs. The conclusions that we have drawn and the subsequent 
recommendations that follow are not meant to discourage. On the contrary, our intention is 
not to minimize the challenges facing these new institutions and we hope that our criticisms 
are seen as constructive ones. However, we would like to address a few warnings.  
First we have been observing a tendency both at the DWA level and at the CMAs’ level, to 
defend the status quo and to forget about the mandate that considered water a laboratory 
from which experimenting on social inequalities redress. If the water reform is to be 
elevated as South Africa symbolic endeavor for social transformation and nation rebuilding, 
then the CMAs should stop looking at themselves as mere management organizations 
instead of political arenas. 
For these reasons, the selection of the governing board members is a particularly crucial 
operation. The level of the expectations and the high technical character of debates related 
to water issues do not leave a lot of room for maneuver, nevertheless these remarks should 
not lead to a selection on the basis of prior competence only. We believe that continued 
training can help overcome these difficulties. Therefore the first selection criterion remains 
that a legitimate candidate to the accession to the governing board should be a committed 
leader of the particular group or stakeholders one’s represents within the governing board. 
Moreover, in order to discourage people interested in the CMAs for the wrong reason, no 
salary should be granted to the governing board members ‘participation to CMAs’ meetings.  
 
Second, we did not only study the current functioning of two CMAs but also the 
establishment process of five of them. However drawing lessons for other CMAs 
establishment process based on a few cases is tricky. Indeed, for instance it is difficult to 
transpose BOCMA experience to other establishment processes because of the advantages 
the Western Cape province benefited from: a better capacitated DWA regional office 
because of the fact that due to the high quality of life in the province, the most qualified 
staff wanted either to stay in Cape Town or to move to Cape Town; the Western Cape is 
composed of a majority of rich white farmers, as the result the social composition and 
challenges are different in this part of the country and the social transformation challenge 
although still substantial, less acute compared to the rest of the country. In areas where 
there are a lot of inherited inequalities, the challenge for a CMA is bigger.  
Nevertheless, in most of our cases we notice that drivers for an accelerated process of CMA 
establishment were bringing us back to commercial farmers’ role. Having passed a first 
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moment of reluctance -just like with WUAs18-, in our case studies they took initiatives in 
order to ensure a prompter CMA establishment. For this reason, and despite their positive 
role in the reform implementation process, one’s has to be vigilant about the role played by 
commercial farmers in these CMA in order to avoid any possible dependency of the CMA 
organization upon these particular stakeholders. Early works already evoked the risk of 
“capture” of these new institutions by vested interests (Woodhouse 1995). In BOCMA, 
commercial farming managed to secure four seats to themselves through different 
portfolios, raising the issue of the balance among different interests within the CMA. 
Moreover, in Inkomati since in some cases municipalities rely on some of the IBs ‘ 
infrastructures in order to abstract water (e.g. Mbombela municipality), we can infer that an 
indirect influence from IBs members towards particular municipalities can develop out of 
these making the municipality’ representatives the objective ally of IBs’ members. 
It is especially important to pay attention to this kind of risk since disadvantaged 
communities have had a tendency over the past to be suspicious towards the CMA 
organization: in the participatory process (water forums) for instance, many of them got the 
impression that the CMA establishment process was an initiative delaying their long-awaited 
opportunity to access water (interview 6). 
In cases where commercial farming interests did not manage to go all the way 
through with the CMA establishment process like in CWM, it is the level of heterogeneity 
among the agricultural sector but not only, that is to be blamed. From that viewpoint, ICMA 
was fortunate enough to not be exposed to this disparity among the farming community –
most of the farmers are involved in the same kind of production19 and depend upon the 
same water resource while in CWM water comes from different sources-. The homogeneity 
factor in Ostrom’s work (Ostrom 2000) is a well-known prerequisite conditioning the 
possibility of designing bottom-up institutional arrangements for governing common-pool 
resources –for instance CMA institution-. 
                                                          
18 The transformation of IBs into WUAs raises problems linked to the absence of compulsory membership; the 
absence of any possibility to levy fees in order to be able to operate; and finally, the complexity of determining 
how to charge new users –some of these new water users recognized in the 1998 Act do not use any volume of 
water (e.g. nature conservation interests)- since there is no available method to do so (the former billing 
method used by IBs was linked to water consumption by irrigators). 
 
19
 The predominant irrigated crop in the Sabie and Sand sub-catchments is citrus. Commercial forestry activities 
are rife in the high rainfall escarpment catchments of the Upper and Middle Crocodile and Kaap catchments. 
The predominant crop in the Upper and Middle Komati catchments is maize, with sugar cane being the main 
crop in the Lower Komati and Lomati catchments ( sugar accounts for over a third of the land irrigated in the 
whole Inkomati basin). (sources: ICMA 2010). 
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Natural conditions play a role in this establishment process. We already mentioned 
climatic conditions as an explaining factor of the presence or absence of IBs: meteorological 
factors push farmers to collective action to solve conflict and struggle against water resource 
depletion in dry climate context. However, it is worth noticing that natural conditions in 
themselves do not determine the pace of CMA’s establishment. Indeed, Usutu is a water 
scarce river basin just like Inkomati: this water-scarce situation even motivated the 
prioritization of the area for experimenting the first compulsory licensing process in the 
country. Yet it is much more the combination of both social/historical factors and natural 
ones which can provide the most satisfactory explanation of quicker establishment process 
in South Africa. In that respect, we could mention as a typical intertwined process the fact 
that the electricity crisis that South Africa could experience in a near future, could rescue the 
water scarcity crisis since the skyrocketing price of electricity in the country is now 
discouraging commercial farmers to over-irrigate their crops (Komati sub-catchment). It 
makes Eskom an indirect ally of water scarcity management since it is installing pump and 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
ANC: African National Congress 
CMA: Catchment Management Agency 
CMS: Catchment Management Strategy 
CROC: Crocodile River Operating Committee 
CWM: Crocodile West and Marico 
ER: Ecological Reserve 
HDI: Historically Disadvantaged Individuals 
IB:  irrigation board 
KZN: KwazuluNatal 
NWRS: National Water Resource Strategy 
RDM: Resource Directed Measure Division (DWA) 
RO: Regional Office (of DWA) 
SANparks: South Africa National parks 
TSB: Transvaal Sugar Limited 
WAR: Water Allocation Reform 
WMA: water management area 
WUA: Water User Association 
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List of interviews 
 
 Inkomati field work session 1 (June 2010): 
 
interview organisation position 
1 ICMA (staff) Governing board secretary 
2 DWA regional office Chief director + regional 
head 
3 ICMA (staff) Water use division executive 
manager /acting CEO 
4 Mbombela municipality Water services Head officer 
5 DWA regional office Former chief director 
6 ICMA Governing board 
member 
Governing board chairperson 
(Representative of SALGA 
Limpopo, treasurer of SALGA 
Limpopo, chairperson of 
Bushbuckridge Water Board 
–january 1999-feb. 2010-; 
Limpopo province 
Department of finance; 
former chairperson of the 
South African association of 
water utilities -association of 
water boards-) 
 





private company reticulating 
water for Nelspruit 
municipality) employee 
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9 ICMA Governing board 
member 
Mpumalanga province 
Tourism and Parks Board 
representative 
10 ICMA (staff) Institution and participation 
division officer 
11 ICMA Governing board 
member 
Bushbuckridge  Water Board 
representative, director of 
water services  
12 ICMA Governing board 
member 








chairperson and member for 




 Tukhela field work (August 2010): 
 
interview organisation position 
14 Forestry SA Environmental consultant 
15 Upper Mvoti IB chairperson 
16 Department of agriculture 
and environmental affairs 
(KZN province), Tugela ferry 
Head officer 
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17 DWA regional office Catchment management 
service, manager 
18 DWA regional office Water quality 
management/ecological 
reserve officers 
19 Tugela Ferry municipality Mayor (IFP) 
20 KZN Water forums ‘ 
participants 
IB chairperson (Mvoti 
catchment) 
21 IB (Mvoti catchment)  member /irrigator 
22 The Siyazisiza trust Rural development/ 
agricultural project facilitator 
and trainer 
23 Tugela Ferry irrigation 
farmers association 
Chairperson + treasurer+ 
board member 
24 Tugela Ferry WUA Chairperson + members 




 BreedeOverBerg field work session 1 (August 2010): 
interviews organisation position 
26 BOCMA (staff) Manager 
 
 BreedeOverBerg field work session 2 (November 2010): 
 
interviews organisation position 
27 CMA governing board HDI 
representative/emerging 
farmer 
 © Bourblanc, 2011, Safewater-Arise project Page 38 
 
28 CMA governing board Environmental and 
conservation division (city of 
Cape Town), officer 
29 CMA governing board Industry and business 
representative, commercial 
farmer 
30 CMA governing board Commercial agriculture 
(surface water-non scheme) 
representative, governing 
board chairperson, former 
municipal councilor 
31 CMA governing board Commercial agriculture 
(groundwater) 
representative 
32 CMA governing board Commercial agriculture 
(surface water scheme) 
representative 
33 CMA governing board Commercial agriculture 
(surface water-non scheme) 
representative, governing 
board chairperson, former 
municipal councilor 
34 DWA regional office CMA Manager, Former 
BOCMA governing board 
member 
35 Provincial government 
(Western cape) 
Integrated environmental 
management, head officer 




37 CMA governing board 
member 
Potential Agriculture Water Use 
by Emerging Farmers’ 
representative 
38 Department of agriculture Water economist 
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(Western Cape province) 
39 CMA governing board 
member 
Civil society representative 
40 ANC local branch 






Environmental consultant Former DWA regional office 
(Western Cape) high-rank 
official 
42 DWA regional office Chief director 
 





 Organisation Position  
43 ICMA  Board Secretary / Legal Advisor  
44 Bushbuckridge Municipality Operational & Maintenance Manager  
45 Dept. of Agric & Rural Dvpt & Land Admin Chief Engineer  
46 Bushbuckridge Water Board Acting Director Water Services Division + 2 officers  
47 SALGA Programme Manager  
48 SAPPI / Water User Association Environmental Manager (SHEQ)  
49 DWA Regional Office Head officer  
50 TSB/KNP/ Irrigation Board Director TSB Sugar ; former Lomati IB chairperson  
51 Civics organization ICMA Governing Board Member  
52 HDI/Bushbuckridge municipal Councilor  ICMA Governing Board Member  
53 Komati River Irrigation Board Chairperson  
54 Mpakeni Tribal Authority Chairperson of Local House  
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55 ICMA Acting CEO  
56 Dinglidale Irrigation Scheme (Emerging 
Farmers) 
Chairperson  
57 Sabie-Sand Farmers Association (Emerging 
Farmer) 
Chairperson  
58 Dept of Environment (Nelspruit 
Environment Center)  
Environmental Officer  
59 Dept of Environment (Environmental Impact 
Assessment Unit) 
Environmental Impact Assessment Officer  
60 Baberton Mines(Fair view mine) manager  
61 Businessman /former politician Former CEO Inkomati CMA  
62 Inkomati CMA Executive Manager Cooperate & Finance  
63 Ehlanzeni District Municipality Deputy Manager Water & Sanitation  
64 Eskom CMA Governing Board Member (industry, power generation and mining representative)  
 
 Usutu to Mhlatuze field work (March 2011): 
interviews organisation position 
65 DWA regional office Compulsory licensing/ ecological reserve 
(quantitative aspect) senior officer + 
officer 
66 KZN wildlife  Ndumo reserve, environmental manager 
67 Mhlatuze Amanzi (water board) CEO 
68 Irrigation forum Chairperson, commercial sugar cane 
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 Crocodile West and Marico field work (March 2011): 
 
 
interviews organisation position 
69 Aurecon Group Environmental consultant (water 
resource management), former 
consultant on the CWM CMA 
establishment process 
70 Rustenberg municipality (TLC) Water 
services 
Former manager/ CWM water forum 
member 
71 Warmbath IB Chairperson 
72 Hartbespoort conservancy Chairperson/ CWM water forum 
member 
73 North West water suppliers authorities  Former manager 
74 DWA regional office (Gauteng) CMA manager 
75 RDP water (Madidi) Representative/ Water forum 
participant 
76 IB/WUA (Magaliesburg) Member, commercial farmer 
77 ANC local branch (Soshanguve) Representative/water forum participant 
78 RDP water (Brits) Representative/ water forum participant 
79 Magalies water board Managing director 
 
 DWA interviews (Pretoria field work) : 
 
interview organisation position 
80 DWA national office, water 
management, Institutional 
director 
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oversight and governance 
81 DWA national office, 
Resource Directed Measures 
(chief directorate), Surface 
water reserve requirement 
Assistant director 
82 DWA national office, 
Resource Directed Measures 
(chief directorate), resource 
requirement 
director 
83 DWA regional office 
(Gauteng), Water resource 
management (Upper Vaal) 
Deputy director 
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Maps of Catchment Management Areas 
 
 











 Inkomati River Basin : 





 Breede OverBerg river basin: 
 




 Thukela river basin: 
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 Usutu to Mhlatuze river basin: 
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